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Abstract: In traditional databases, the entity resolution problem (which is also known as deduplication)
refers to the task of mapping multiple manifestations of virtual objects to their corresponding real-world
entities. When addressing this problem, in both theory and practice, it is widely assumed that such
sets of virtual objects appear as the result of clerical errors, transliterations, missing or updated
attributes, abbreviations, and so forth. In this paper, we address this problem under the assumption
that this situation is caused by malicious actors operating in domains in which they do not wish
to be identified, such as hacker forums and markets in which the participants are motivated to
remain semi-anonymous (though they wish to keep their true identities secret, they find it useful for
customers to identify their products and services). We are therefore in the presence of a different, and
even more challenging, problem that we refer to as adversarial deduplication. In this paper, we study
this problem via examples that arise from real-world data on malicious hacker forums and markets
arising from collaborations with a cyber threat intelligence company focusing on understanding this
kind of behavior. We argue that it is very difficult—if not impossible—to find ground truth data on
which to build solutions to this problem, and develop a set of preliminary experiments based on
training machine learning classifiers that leverage text analysis to detect potential cases of duplicate
entities. Our results are encouraging as a first step towards building tools that human analysts can
use to enhance their capabilities towards fighting cyber threats.
Keywords: adversarial deduplication; machine learning classifiers; cyber threat intelligence
1. Introduction and Motivation
The classical problem of entity resolution—or deduplication—in databases seeks to address situations
in which seemingly distinct records are stored that actually refer to the same entity (object, person,
place, etc.) in the real world. Typically, the goal is to identify and merge such records [1,2]. See Section 4
for a discussion of related work.
The characteristic that is overwhelmingly shared among these traditional approaches is that they
assume that the existence of multiple records for the same real entity is the product of involuntary
situations such as simple typos during data entry procedures, ambiguity in attribute values such as
Information 2018, 9, 189; doi:10.3390/info9080189 www.mdpi.com/journal/information
Information 2018, 9, 189 2 of 16
transliterations and abbreviations, and inconsistency and incompleteness due to overspecification and
underspecification (two addresses for the same person, or address completely missing), respectively,
or evolving values such as address changes. In this paper, we are interested in situations in which these
assumptions simply cannot be made because there are actors who may purposefully be taking actions
towards hiding their identity behind multiple profiles. Take, for instance, the setting of malicious hacker
forums on the Dark/Deep Web, in which participants seek to buy and sell different kinds of goods
such as malware, passwords, credit card numbers, and other illicit materials. There is an interesting
dynamic that arises among the participants in these forums and marketplaces: though of course
they wish to remain anonymous–especially from government agents who may be watching—they
on the other hand also wish to maintain their reputation within the community, and must therefore
remain identifiable. The same actor typically operates using different profiles, but keeping certain
characteristics constant. Perhaps most importantly, they also leave involuntary traces behind that can be
analyzed and leveraged by deduplication tools. We refer to this as the adversarial deduplication/entity
resolution problem. Figure 1 illustrates this situation via a simple visualization. Consider the problem of
trying to determine clues that point to the conclusion that a given pair of faces might correspond to
the same real-world user (or perhaps to the opposite conclusion).
User Name: Hexxx 
Last Access: 2018/05/29 
Location: USA 
Posts: 543 
User Name: Wit 
Last Access: 2018/06/10 
Location: Russia 
Posts: 412 
User Name: Av0id 
Last Access: 2018/06/15 
Location: USA 
Posts: 701 
User Name: Dox 
Last Access: 2018/06/15 
Location: Canada 
Posts: 701 
User Name: tekio 
Last Access: 2018/06/11 
Location: USA 
Posts: 301 
User Name: pirat 
Last Access: 2018/06/21 
Location: Ukraine 
Posts: 613 
User Name: Crew 
Last Access: 2018/06/23 
Location: India 
Posts: 988 
User Name: freek 
Last Access: 2018/06/24 
Location: India 
Posts: 577 
Figure 1. In real-world applications such as Dark Web forums and marketplaces, it may not always be
clear who is behind user profiles. In particular, there may be two or more profiles that correspond to
the same person.
The following is a simplified example of the kind of information that we can obtain from dark
web forums and marketplaces.
Example 1. Consider the database schemas shown for the tables in Figure 2, where we have a table for forums,
topics, and posts. In this paper, we focus on the posts, since they are the main source of material that can be used
towards identifying potential duplicates.
This information is based on the system developed in [3] and CYR3CON (https://cyr3con.ai)
for cyber threat intelligence, which scrapes data from various social platforms, especially in the dark
net and deep net. They collect and store information from hacker forum discussions and marketplaces
offering products and services that focus on malicious hacking, such as sales of malware/exploits
(including CVE numbers, which are identifiers given by the National Vulnerability Database [4,5]) and
hacker forums (discussions regarding services and threats). The crawling and parsing of these sites
yields time-varying data, since the system periodically returns to the same sites.
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postId postContent postedDate scrapedDate forumsId recordedDate userId topicId
11e9d297a29899f6a69c3da05391acaa [u'', the only good way to work in computer security straight is to be 
a "black hat" then at some point (arrested a few to many times, you 
get a wife/family) you decide you can't do it any more. the other 
way is to go into sysadmin and at some point, once you have 
experience going into nothing but security.        , u'', i see way to 
many people about trying to sell themselves as pen-testers and 
security consultants and know fuck all, don't be one of those 
people., u'']
11/10/2008 1/22/2017 56 11/10/2008 352820 481581
da1a4e396af0e1b87ba0d3a81b1e6277 your only recourse is using a second 3.60 or updated unit, or ps3 to 
download the games, then transfer them to your vita or qcma. and 
that only works for games you purchased, it isn't a gateway to 
piracy.
6/3/2017 6/5/2017 134 6/3/2017 75065 821237
92ac4e1e3cdb886080c6af2a528673eb and i don^t particularly agree with touting this method either. why 
use wm_vsh_menu to call wmm functions to prepare the cfw when 
psnpatch does a fine job...?it^s not explained here but i assume it^s 
to run jb folder games to go online. however there is a good reason 
for psnpatch to remove cobra hooks stopping many jb folder games 
from working. bypassing this feature is not a smart idea for most 
users. i don^t recommend to do it. cfw users should always stick to 
iso & the psnpatch method. as to the title given the fact that the 
only users who require jb folders are cheaters & modders i 
wouldn^t actually hold my breath when telling them they will 
"never" get banned if they follow these steps... assuming that these 
steps will prevent a ban is not the same as knowing they will....
3/19/2017 6/23/2017 93 3/19/2017 1807 946623
forumsId boardsName
56 null
134 vitahacks
93 thread locked
topicId topicName
481581 [u'white hat hacker carrer']
821237 bought psn games on 3.63question (self.vitahacks)
946623 thread locked
Figure 2. Snippets of the hackingPosts, forums, and topics tables from our dataset.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents our method to train machine
learning classifiers to recognize posts made by users based on text analysis techniques, Section 3
presents our empirical evaluation consisting of two main experiments (a first phase consisting of a
broad evaluation of different classifiers and hyperparameter settings, and a second phase analyzing
the effectiveness of the best two in finding pairs of entities), and Sections 4 and 5 discuss related work
and conclusions, respectively.
2. Deduplication Leveraging Text-Based Features
We now present a proposal for applying machine learning techniques towards solving adversarial
deduplication problems. Note that the general approach is not novel, and has been applied in
several other problems, such as malware identification and attribution, among others (cf. Section 4
for a discussion). However, to the best of our knowledge this is the first such proposal for this
problem. Essentially, we wish to develop a lightweight method by which posts written by users can be
automatically analyzed and deduplication hypotheses can be generated so that human analysts can step
in to provide a more in-depth analysis. The workflow can be summarized in the following steps:
• Procure information from online discussions in forums and marketplaces; this is an ongoing effort
that is generally carried out in a semi-automatic manner by specialists [6].
• Prepare the data by performing several cleaning processes (see below).
• Train one or more machine learning classifiers to recognize posts written by each user. For this
step, we assume that posts made under different user names correspond to different users—we
come back to this assumption when analyzing the results yielded in the testing phase. Note
that another option is to train a single multi-class classifier that discriminates among all users.
We decided to train one classifier per user for two main reasons: (a) large numbers of users (classes,
in that case) are more difficult to manage, and the resulting classifier would be less flexible—by
training one classifier per user it is possible to incorporate features that only apply to certain users;
(b) perhaps most importantly, we would like to be flexible with respect to the incorporation of
new users, which would cause the single classifier to be retrained with each addition.
• Apply the classifiers to pairs of new posts by users X and Y; if either X’s classifier states that a post
written by Y was written by X, or vice versa, then we generate a deduplication hypothesis.
• The set of deduplication hypotheses are sent to human analysts for further treatment.
Information 2018, 9, 189 4 of 16
Note that if we have no further information about the authors of posts, for n users we would have
to analyze (n2) pairs to see if they actually correspond to the same user. For 50 users, this amounts to
1225, and for 100 we have 4950, which are already intractable numbers. Clearly, scaling such a brute
force analysis to larger numbers of users is impossible (cf. Table 1). The general goal of our method is
therefore to greatly reduce the set of pairs that humans must actually look at.
Table 1. Numbers of unordered pairs of users needed to be inspected by brute force analysis.
Number of Users n Number of Possible Pairs (n2)
50 1225
100 4950
150 11,175
200 19,900
500 124,750
1000 499,500
2000 1,999,000
5000 12,497,500
10,000 49,995,000
Analyzing text via n-grams: In order to extract basic elements from text, one common tool is
the use of an n-gram, which can be defined in different ways. Here, we adopt the commonly used
definition of an n-gram as a sequence of n characters. The advantage of using n-grams instead of
directly analyzing a text is that typos, spelling variations, and other kinds of differences yield sets of
n-grams that are closely related.
Example 2. Consider the word “software” and some common misspellings/intentional variations used by online
communities: sofware, softwarez, and sophwarez. If we consider the 2-grams and 3-grams for each of these terms,
we arrive at the following sets:
2-grams 3-grams
software so, of, ft, tw, wa, ar, re sof, oft, ftw, twa, war, are
sofware so, of, fw, wa, ar, re sof, ofw, fwa, war, are
softwarez so, of, ft, tw, wa, ar, re, ez sof, oft, ftw, twa, war, are, rez
sophwarez so, op, ph, hw, wa, ar, re, ez sop, oph, phw, hwa, war, are, rez
Clearly, even the two most different variations (software and sophwarez) still share several n-grams.
The value of n is a parameter to be tuned—a range within [3,7] has been found to work well in this kind of
analysis [3].
Our working hypothesis is therefore that properly trained machine learning classifiers can detect
unintentional traces left behind in the writing of people who are trying to hide behind multiple
profiles in online forums and markets. In the next section we present the design and results of a set of
experiments carried out as a preliminary attempt towards proving this hypothesis.
3. Empirical Evaluation
We adopted the following basic setup for the evaluation of our approach with real-world data,
which was carried out in two main experiments (see below):
• Dataset: posts table, which contains 89, 766 posts users table, which contains 128 users.
• Data cleaning and preparation: We removed HTML tags from posts using the BeautifulSoup tool
(https://www.crummy.com/software/BeautifulSoup), removed URLs, extra spaces, and strings
that contained a combination of letters and numbers. Finally, we discarded posts that either
contained less than 140 characters (i.e., anything shorter than the maximum length of an SMS
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message or tweet before the expansion) or any of the following strings “quote from:”, “quote:”,
“wrote:”, “originally posted by”, “re:”, or “begin pgp message”. This yielded 40, 453 “clean” posts
corresponding to 54 users.
• Feature generation: We used the well-known TF-IDF (term frequency-inverse document frequency)
technique to produce vectors of features based on n-grams, which essentially consists of assigning
weights to features in such a way that they increase proportionally to the number of times they
occur in a document, and also takes into account the number of times the feature occurs in the
whole corpus.
• Classifiers: Different standard machine learning approaches were implemented with a standard
Python library (http://scikit-learn.org/stable):
– Decision Trees
– Logistic Regression
– Multinomial Bayesian Networks
– Random Forests
– Support Vector Machines, with both linear and radial basis function (rbf) kernels
• Hyperparameters: We explored different values of two main hyperparameters: max_df and n_gram
range. The former is a bound on the frequency with which a feature occurs in a post (essentially,
as frequency increases the information content of a feature becomes lower), while the latter
determines the length of the substrings into which the text is split. This yielded a set of 52 classifier
instances (cf. Table 2).
For some classifier instances, we also applied a bound on the number of features taken into
account by the classifier (max_features). This space was explored manually by testing the effect
of different settings on performance and running time (more features yield better performance,
up to a certain point). The final selection yielded the following:
– DT2 is DT1 with max_features = 2500
– DT3 is DT1 with max_features = 2000
– DT9 is DT8 with max_features = 3000
– DT5 has max_features = 3000
– DT6 has max_features = 2000
– DT18 is DT17 with max_features = 5000
– MNB6 is MNB5 with max_features = 3000
This set of classifier instances was generated by means of manual exploration of the hyperparameters,
looking for the combinations that had the most potential to yield high values for precision and recall.
3.1. Empirical Evaluation Phase 1: Broad Evaluation of Different Classifiers and Hyperparameter Settings
The goal of the first set of experiments was to find the best-performing classifier instances among
the 52 shown in Table 2. Towards this end, we conducted three trials of the following set of steps:
• Choose 10 users at random.
• Training phase: For each user ui, train a classifier Ci using between 200 and 500 sample posts
written by them (positive examples, actual number of posts depended on availability) and the
same number of posts written under other screen names (presumed negative examples).
• Testing phase: For each user, take 20 test posts that were not used to train any of the classifiers and
query each resulting classifier. This yields a confusion matrix M where each row corresponds to
a user and each column to a classifier. M(i, j) contains the number of posts classified by classifier
Cj as corresponding to user ui. Note that a perfect confusion matrix in this case should have
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a value of 20 along the diagonal, and values of zero in all other cells. Table 3 shows an actual
instance of such a matrix.
Table 2. Complete description of hyperparameter settings for all classifier instances.
ID Classifier Type max_df n-grams
SVC1 SVM–linear kernel 0.02 [3,3]
SVC2 SVM–linear kernel 0.03 [3,3]
SVC3 SVM–linear kernel 0.02 [4,4]
SVC4 SVM–linear kernel 0.01 [4,4]
SVC5 SVM–linear kernel 0.03 [5,5]
SVC6 SVM–linear kernel 0.03 [3,4]
SVC7 SVM–linear kernel 0.06 [3,4]
SVC8 SVM–rbf kernel 0.01 [3,3]
SVC9 SVM–rbf kernel 0.05 [3,3]
SVC10 SVM–rbf kernel 0.03 [3,3]
SVC11 SVM–rbf kernel 0.05 [4,4]
SVC12 SVM–rbf kernel 0.08 [4,4]
SVC13 SVM–rbf kernel 0.05 [5,5]
SVC14 SVM–rbf kernel 0.03 [5,5]
DT1 Decision Tree 0.05 [3,3]
DT2 Decision Tree 0.05 [3,3]
DT3 Decision Tree 0.05 [3,3]
DT4 Decision Tree 0.02 [3,3]
DT5 Decision Tree 0.03 [3,3]
DT6 Decision Tree 0.03 [3,3]
DT7 Decision Tree 0.009 [3,3]
DT8 Decision Tree 0.03 [4,4]
DT9 Decision Tree 0.03 [4,4]
DT11 Decision Tree 0.02 [4,4]
DT12 Decision Tree 0.05 [4,4]
DT13 Decision Tree 0.01 [4,4]
DT14 Decision Tree 0.05 [5,5]
DT15 Decision Tree 0.03 [5,5]
DT16 Decision Tree 0.02 [5,5]
DT17 Decision Tree 0.01 [5,5]
DT18 Decision Tree 0.01 [5,5]
MNB1 Multinomial Bayesian Network 0.02 [3,3]
MNB2 Multinomial Bayesian Network 0.01 [3,3]
MNB3 Multinomial Bayesian Network 0.008 [3,3]
MNB4 Multinomial Bayesian Network 0.007 [3,3]
MNB5 Multinomial Bayesian Network 0.005 [3,3]
MNB6 Multinomial Bayesian Network 0.005 [3,3]
MNB7 Multinomial Bayesian Network 0.005 [4,4]
MNB8 Multinomial Bayesian Network 0.005 [4,4]
MNB9 Multinomial Bayesian Network 0.003 [5,5]
LR1 Logistic Regression 0.03 [3,3]
LR2 Logistic Regression 0.02 [3,3]
LR3 Logistic Regression 0.03 [4,4]
LR4 Logistic Regression 0.01 [4,4]
LR5 Logistic Regression 0.03 [5,5]
LR6 Logistic Regression 0.01 [5,5]
RF1 Random Forest 0.03 [3,3]
RF2 Random Forest 0.02 [3,3]
RF3 Random Forest 0.03 [4,4]
RF4 Random Forest 0.02 [4,4]
RF5 Random Forest 0.03 [5,5]
RF6 Random Forest 0.02 [5,5]
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Table 3. Example of a confusion matrix for Experiment 1. Columns correspond to users and rows to
classifiers. Each cell M(i, j) contains the number of posts (out of 20) for which classifier Ci answered
yes for a post actually authored by user uj. The diagonal is highlighted in boldface.
352792 20307 117723 43315 161133 282143 353596 352809 13585 146319
C352792 19 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1
C20307 7 17 6 5 9 9 2 3 2 9
C117723 5 5 19 6 4 3 4 6 1 9
C43315 9 2 1 17 2 0 2 6 1 8
C161133 5 4 4 7 17 2 5 0 0 13
C282143 4 9 9 8 2 14 4 4 0 9
C353596 12 7 11 16 8 3 17 8 6 14
C352809 3 6 4 8 4 3 8 10 0 9
C13585 1 2 9 4 4 7 9 2 17 9
C146319 12 5 7 10 10 4 9 5 1 17
• In order to evaluate the performance of each classifier, we make use of the following notions:
– True positives (tp): A test post written by user ui is classified correctly by classifier Ci;
the number of true positives for Ci is found at position M(i, i).
– False positives (fp): A test post written by user ui is classified incorrectly by a classifier Cj 6= Ci;
the number of false positives for Ci can be found by calculating ∑j 6=i M(i, j).
– True negatives (tn): A test post written by user ui is classified correctly by a classifier Cj 6= Ci;
the number of true negatives for each classifier is simply (10 − 1) · 20 − ∑i 6=j M(i, j) =
180−∑i 6=j M(i, j).
– False negatives (fn): A test post written by user ui is classified incorrectly by classifier Ci;
the number of false negatives for Ci is calculated as 20−M(i, i).
Based on the confusion matrix M and the above calculations, we can then derive:
precision(Ci) =
tp(Ci)
tp(Ci) + fp(Ci)
and
recall(Ci) =
tp(Ci)
tp(Ci) + fn(Ci)
,
which are standard metrics used to evaluate classifier performance. Finally, the harmonic mean
of these two values, known as the F1 measure, is typically used as a good way to compare the
performance of a set of classifiers.
Finally, we take the average of the three runs to obtain the final results, which we report next.
3.2. Results for Phase 1
The results of this set of experiments are shown in Figure 3 (classification performance) and
Figure 4 (running time); each graph in the former shows the values obtained for precision, recall, and
F1 measure. The typical tradeoff between precision and recall can be observed in each graph—though
all instances had quite high values for recall, the classifiers that did best with respect to this measure
did so at a high cost in precision (cf. MNB2, which boasted a recall of 0.96 but only 0.2 in precision.
Figure 5 groups together the two best performers for each type of classifier.
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Figure 3. Precision, recall, and F1 values for all classifiers evaluated in Phase 1: (a) Decision Trees,
(b) Logistic Regression, (c) Multinomial Bayesian Networks, (d) Random Forests, and (e) Support
Vector Machines. In each graph, classifier instances are sorted in descending order of F1 measure.
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Figure 4. Running time taken to train and test each classifier instance from Phase 1, sorted by their F1
measure in the charts from Figure 3.
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Note that, since there were 10 users in this phase, trying to solve the problem by random
chance would succeed with probability 0.1. Therefore, the classifiers with the best precisions in
Figure 5—SVC13, SVC14, LR6, and LR4—were 4.9 to 5.8 times better than this baseline.
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Figure 5. Best two performers from each chart in Figure 3, sorted by F1 measure.
3.3. Empirical Evaluation Phase 2: Seeding Known Duplicates
In this second part, we selected several classifiers—depending on their performance in
Phase 1—and evaluated their capability to find duplicates. We took the best performers on their
own, and also built several ensembles applying the bootstrap aggregation method, in which a set of
classifiers is used in conjunction and a majority vote yields the final result. The choice was made among
those shown in Figure 5, mostly by their performance with respect to F1 measure, which would yield
SVC13 and SVC14. However, even though SVC14 performed slightly better than LR6, we chose the
latter for the second pure classifier in order to favor diversity. The list of classifiers was the following:
• SVC13
• LR6
• E1 = {SVC13, SVC14, LR6, LR4}
• E2 = {SVC13, SVC14, LR6}
• E3 = {SVC13, SVC14, LR4}
• E4 = {SVC13, LR4, LR6}
• E5 = {SVC14, LR4, LR6}
Since, as discussed earlier, in this domain it is very difficult (or impossible) to obtain ground
truth data, we engineered pairs of duplicates by simply dividing k users’ posts into two sets and
training independent classifiers with this data. Now, the definition of true/false positive and true/false
negative depends on the type of pair being considered:
• For a pair of users that is known (or, rather, assumed) to be different:
– True negative: classifier says no
– False positive: classifier says yes
True positives and false negatives are impossible in this case.
• For a pair of users that is known to correspond to a duplicate:
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– True positive: classifier says yes
– False negative: classifier says no
True negatives and false positives are impossible in this case.
Now, consider the task of choosing p pairs of users (ui, uj) at random and presenting 20 test posts
for each user to the classifier corresponding to the opposite user (so, ui’s posts to Cj, and vice versa).
For k = 2, given that we have 54 + 2 = 56 users (the original plus the duplicates), we have(
54 + 2 = 56
2
)
= 1540
possible pairs. In order to simulate a reasonable percentage of duplicates in the number of pairs tested,
we conducted runs varying p ∈ {20, 40, 60, 80} and calculated the resulting precision, recall, and F1
values, averaging over two runs of each—the results are presented in Figure 6.
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Figure 6. Evaluation of classification performance for chosen classifiers (two pure, five ensemble)
over 54 users plus 2 duplicates engineered by splitting two of the original users, varying the number
of pairs p sampled at random (guaranteed to contain the duplicate pairs): (a) p = 20, (b) p = 40,
(c) p = 60, and (d) p = 80.
3.4. Results for Phase 2
The first thing that was evident when analyzing the results was that all classifiers’ performance
with respect to precision was much lower than those obtained in Phase 1. This can be explained
by the sharp increase in the number of users with respect to the previous experiment (from 10 to
56)—giving many more opportunities for the classifiers to yield false positives. It should be noted,
as before, that a classifier working by randomly answering yes one out of n times (for n users) would
only have precision 1/56 ≈ 0.0178. Therefore, the values of 0.2468 (LR6) and 0.2176 (E1)—the two best
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when p = 20—were about 13.86 and 12.22 times higher, respectively. Furthermore, precision became
lower as p increased, reaching 0.0769 (LR6) and 0.0673 (LR6) for p = 80 (still about 4.32 and 3.78 times
better than chance, respectively). On the other hand, recall remained quite good for all classifiers,
irrespective of the value of p, and was consistently better for SVC13—and all ensembles dominated by
SVC classifiers—compared with LR6 (which had higher precision).
Finally, let us consider the last two steps of the workflow presented in Section 2, which involve
the generation of deduplication hypotheses. Recall that what we are calling false positives in these
experiments can actually be manifestations of unknown duplicates—pairs of user names that actually
correspond to the same person. In order to deal with the relatively high incidence of such false positives
that we saw above when we computed precision, we could set a threshold value t consisting of the
number of times that posts presented to a different classifier trigger a positive response before we issue
a deduplication hypothesis. For the same setting used in this experiment, we computed the number
of deduplication hypotheses generated by each classifier (recall that the total number of unordered
pairs was 1540 in this case, the percentage of this total is indicated in each case). So, for instance,
SVC13 identified 94.28% of the pairs as potential duplicates, for threshold t = 10:
• For t = 10:
– SVC13: 1452 (94.28%)
– LR6: 451 (29.28%)
– E1: 605 (39.28%)
– E2: 1444 (93.76%)
– E3: 1445 (93.83%)
– E4: 609 (39.54%)
– E5: 599 (38.89%)
• For t = 15:
– SVC13: 1425 (92.53%)
– LR6: 140 (9.09%)
– E1: 204 (13.24%)
– E2: 1396 (90.64%)
– E3: 1396 (90.64%)
– E4: 203 (13.18%)
– E5: 207 (13.44%)
Two conclusions can be drawn from these results: First, the lower precision yielded by SVC13
in Phase 1 (as well as Phase 2 for the ensembles dominated by SVC-based classifiers) actually had
farther-reaching causes than one might initially suspect by looking at the final quality measures,
since the false positive rate was clearly quite high (as evidenced by the small change in number of
hypotheses when increasing the value of t). Second, even though the performance of LR6 was also
low in Phase 2, it was nonetheless capable of reducing the number of pairs to inspect by over 70% for
t = 10 (i.e., at least half of the test posts), and over 90% for t = 15 (i.e., at least three-quarters of the test
posts). This last phenomenon was also observable for the ensembles in which logistic regression-based
classifiers had an important role (E1, E4, and E5).
Example 3. The following posts are a few examples from a pair of users that, according to LR6, could have been
written by the same person:
• Posts by user 353596:
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“lol i have that pasted to the front door of my officebut if we really want to get technical here...these are all
"cheap" translations of binary. i will type up a full explanation from home tonight. i also dug up and old
piece of software that i have that is wonderful for quick lookups. i will post that as well.”
“well "%path%" is the variable name. "path" is a term. it is always more important to learns terms and
concepts rather than syntax that is specific to an environment.but yeah”
“didnˆt mean to burst your bubble about the script. i also saw some of the samples but none of them conviced
me that the user thought they were really talking to a human being. most were prolly playing along like i do
there are some msn ones also... anyone has visited they didnˆt sign up for the forums. but thatˆs ok they can
lurk for a while :whatsup:”
• Posts by user 352820:
“there are a few newish tools for but the issues with bt in the first place was poor implementation on behalf of
the manufacturers, most of which were fixed.”
“well if talking about power friendly then a hd in lan enclosure would be best. you could build something
that would consume less power but it would be more expensive, unless you are looking for and upwards.”
“the only good way to work in computer security straight is to be a "black hat" then at some point (arrested
a few to many times, you get a wife/family) you decide you can’t do it any more. the other way is to go
into sysadmin and at some point, once you have experience going into nothing but security, u”, i see way
to many people about trying to sell themselves as pen-testers and security consultants and know fuck all,
don’t be one of those people.”
Having identified this pair of users as a deduplication hypothesis, human expert analysts can then take
a closer look into their posts, activities, and other data in order to confirm or reject it.
4. Related Work
Though there have been several approaches in the general areas of databases and cyber
security/security informatics that tackle problems similar to adversarial deduplication, there are important
differences. The following discusses the body of work in these two areas that is closest to our efforts.
Most of the research carried out towards the development of general tools for solving
deduplication/entity resolution problems has been carried out in the databases community. Traditional
approaches involve leveraging pairwise similarity over entity attributes [7], but other promising
proposals are based on so-called collective entity resolution [8], which exploits additional relational
information in the data since references to different entities may co-occur. An example of such
an approach is called iterative blocking [9], which is based on iteratively grouping together matching
records in blocks. This allows the use of the information processed so far to inform further decisions.
Other approaches use similar techniques to the ones adopted here, in which machine learning classifiers
are learned from examples and later used to determine whether or not an arbitrary pair of records
are duplicates of each other based on a wide variety of features [8,10]. Recently, [11] defined a
declarative framework for entity resolution based on matching dependencies (MDs). This formalism
was first introduced in [12,13], and consists of declarative rules that generalize entity resolution
tasks, eliminating duplicates via a matching process. These rules state that certain attribute values
in relational tuples, under certain similarity conditions over possibly other attribute values in those
tuples, must be made the same. The original semantics for MDs, defined in [13], was redefined and
extended in [14].
As mentioned in the Introduction, most of the approaches developed in the databases literature
operate under the assumption that duplications are the effect of clerical errors in data entry, inherent
ambiguity in names or other attributes, inconsistent abbreviations and formatting, etc., rather than
the fact that the objects (users in this case) are explicitly trying to obfuscate their identities [8–10].
As a result of this, and due to the nature of the information that can be collected from the type of source
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we are looking at (forums and other sites in the Dark Web), the dataset does not contain the relational
information and structure needed for these proposals to be applied.
In the security informatics/cybersecurity literature, the general problem of identifying deceptive
behavior with respect to identity has been around for almost two decades—to the best of our
knowledge, [15] is the earliest appearance of this issue, where the issue of anonymity is central.
In a similar vein, [16,17] are other works on detecting aliases, also with a focus on anonymity guarantees.
Historically, stylometry is one of the more widely used methods for authorship analysis. It studies the
personal characteristics of individuals’ writing style—a survey of recent approaches to the authorship
problem can be found in [18], and some notable works include [19–21]. In [22], the authors apply
stylometry techniques towards attributing authorship of instant messages, making use of features such
as frequency distributions for characters, words, emoticons, function words, short words, abbreviations,
and punctuation, average word length, and average words per sentence, whether or not the message
contains a greeting/farewell, and spelling/grammatical errors. It is possible that extending our
approach with a deeper analysis of features such as these for specific forums and marketplaces would
help us improve the accuracy of our methods. One of the problems with the application of such
technique(s) to the kind of data we seek to analyze is the length of the texts, which are considerably
short and therefore identification (classification) accuracy suffers. Not surprisingly, even just a few
short sentences can carry a great deal of information that a human analyst can use for identification,
but that information goes beyond the style of the writing. Additional techniques that are capable of
exploiting specific domain information are needed. The work of [23] suggests that contextual analysis
and tolerance to uncertainty are especially needed for the identification of individuals in social media
forensics. Tsikerdekis and Zeadally [24], on the other hand, also incorporate non-verbal behavior to
aid user identification.
Another work that is closely related to ours is that of [25]. In that paper, the authors focus on the
related problem of authorship matching, which seeks to validate whether or not two accounts having
the same username on multiple Dark Web forums belong to the same person through writing style
analysis (stylometry) and SVMs. An N two-way classification model, where N is the number of authors
being tested, was trained with a set of ten active users (the ones with at least 400 posts and around
6000 words), divided into two parts, each containing half the posts of each user. In a validation phase,
the best parameters for the model were found, in order to test it against the forum post of another set of
accounts in a different Dark Web forum having the same username as the ones used in the validation
phase. Using different types of similarity functions to evaluate the performance, their approach yielded
around 80% accuracy. The authorship matching problem is based on the assumption that there is
a tendency in users to adopt similar usernames for their accounts in different sites. Though the results
are promising, this assumption is quite strong and is not always valid in adversarial settings where
users try to obfuscate their identities. In such scenarios, looking for equal or syntactically similar user
names does not seem to be reasonable.
The problem of detecting sock puppets is also quite related to the general problem of reasoning
about author identities [26–28]. The term “sock puppet” is commonly applied to multiple user accounts
that are created and used with the purpose of creating the illusion of support within a community,
such as artificially increasing the number of positive votes on a social media post. Though some of
the underlying techniques applied to this problem are shared with the other work discussed here,
there is one important distinguishing characteristic: sock puppets inherently involve interactions
among themselves and the original user, whereas in adversarial deduplication settings it is probably
the case that different profiles created by the same person do not interact.
The work that is perhaps the closest in spirit to the results that we show here is [29], in which
the authors tackle the problems of determining aliases and attributing authorship using machine
learning classifiers that work with three kinds of features: character-level n-grams, stylometry, and
timestamps. Though their approach to determining aliases shares several aspects with our own,
the main differences lie in that their solutions involve a high degree of specialization, since single
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topic posts are used in the evaluation, stylometry-based techniques that depend on the specific data,
and analysis of timestamps. On the other other hand, our goal is to develop a general approach that
(i) requires minimal domain-specific preparation; (ii) is flexible with respect to the set of users in the
domain (i.e., it should be easy to add or remove users); (iii) makes as few assumptions as possible
regarding user behavior.
Finally, the same kind of analysis based on applying machine learning techniques such as
classifiers and clustering algorithms has been successfully adopted in other problems related to cyber
security, such as the identification of product offerings in malicious hacker markets [30], at-risk system
identification [31], and exploit prediction [32]. Though these are difficult problems, their advantage
over adversarial deduplication is the availability of some kind of ground truth that can be used to
evaluate and tune the proposed solutions.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we tackle the so-called adversarial deduplication problem, which seeks to identify
pairs of users who are actively trying to hide their identity by creating multiple profiles. We argue that
this problem is fundamentally different from but closely related to the traditional entity resolution
or deduplication problem in databases, since this problem is assumed to arise as a consequence
of unintentional errors. We focus on the cyber-security setting of malicious hacker forums and
marketplaces on the dark web, where such intentional obfuscation is the norm.
As a first step towards developing tools to address this problem, we proposed the use of machine
learning classifiers trained to identify text-based features, and designed a set of experiments to evaluate
their effectiveness. Our preliminary results are promising in that reasonably high precision and recall
could be obtained in an initial training and evaluation phase with few users. In a second phase with
over 50 users, the precision became much lower due to the incidence of false positives. However,
since the overall goal of the approach is to create deduplication hypotheses that are then passed on to
human analysts for further review, an additional threshold parameter could be applied to manage the
number of generated hypotheses. Furthermore, it should be noted that in a system deployed in the
real world, classifiers may need to be periodically retrained in order to incorporate information from
new posts, as well as new classifiers trained for new users. The specific period for carrying out these
operations will depend on the details of the domain in question.
Future work includes carrying out further experiments with other datasets, and identifying or
learning other features (potentially quite complex) to incorporate them to the task, aiming to capture
the context in which these posts are issued, such as topics in which users post, co-occurrence with
other users, abnormality in learned behaviors, etc.
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